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In 1996 my first book, The Cuban Missile Crisis, was published. A reworking of my doctoral dissertation, it examined the roles played by a number of key figures in the coming and handling of the October 1962 crisis. It was followed a year 
later by Missiles in Cuba, which was aimed at the undergraduate market. In both 
these works, I utilised the available primary sources, including the transcripts of the 
meetings of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council (ExComm) 
that had been secretly taped by John F. Kennedy using concealed microphones. For 
my 1996 book, these transcripts were available only for the ExComm meetings held 
on 16 October 1962, the opening day of the missile crisis, and on 27 October, the 
penultimate day. For my 1997 study, I was able to use the very rough transcripts 
that had become available for a couple of additional ExComm meetings. For other 
ExComm discussions, myself and other scholars were dependent on the laconic 
minutes that had been taken.1
In 1997, however, Ernest May and Philip Zelikow’s The Kennedy Tapes was 
published. Employing the services of a team of court reporters, an audio-forensics 
expert and some Kennedy administration officials, they were able to convert the 
sometimes-muffled Kennedy Library ExComm recordings (many of which had just 
been released) into lucid transcripts, and were able to present a complete record of the 
ExComm meetings, rather than transcripts of just a select few of these discussions. In 
2001, with the assistance of Timothy Naftali, May and Zelikow provided revised and 
improved ExComm transcripts as part of the Miller Center presidential recordings 
project. This paper aims to utilise these transcripts to reflect on the Kennedy 
administration’s handling of the most dangerous episode in the Cold War era, an 
appropriate endeavour in 2012, the 50th anniversary of the Cuban missile crisis. 
In doing so, I will make use of a good deal of primary source material that was not 
available when I wrote my two books on this subject.2
1 Mark J. White, The Cuban Missile Crisis (Basingstoke and London: Macmillan, 1996); Mark J. 
White, Missiles in Cuba: Kennedy, Khrushchev, Castro and the 1962 Crisis (Chicago, IL: Ivan R. Dee, 
1997); ‘Off-the-Record Meeting on Cuba’, 11:50 a.m.–12.57 p.m., 16 October 1962, transcript, 
presidential recordings, John F. Kennedy Library, Boston, MA; ‘Off-the-Record Meeting on Cuba’, 
6:30 p.m.-7.55 p.m., 16 October 1962, transcript, presidential recordings, Kennedy Library; Cuban 
Missile Crisis Meetings, 27 October 1962, transcript, presidential recordings, Kennedy Library.
2 Ernest R. May and Philip D. Zelikow, The Kennedy Tapes: Inside the White House during the Cuban 
Missile Crisis (Cambridge, MA, and London: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1997), 
hereafter cited as Kennedy Tapes; Timothy Naftali and Philip Zelikow (eds.), The Presidential 
Recordings: John F. Kennedy: The Great Crises (New York and London: Norton, 2001), vol. II — 
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The full ExComm transcripts enable historians to gauge with greater precision 
than used to be possible the contributions made by John Kennedy and his advisers. 
Much of what scholars have said on this subject has been influenced by Attorney 
General Robert F. Kennedy’s posthumously-published memoir of the missile crisis, 
Thirteen Days, which — it was later revealed — had been edited by JFK’s speechwriter 
Theodore C. Sorensen. What Thirteen Days claimed was that, along with his elder 
brother, Robert Kennedy was the hero of the missile crisis. He was the man who had 
the courage to oppose the administration hawks, who were recklessly recommending 
a US attack on Cuba, by proposing the more moderate strategy of imposing a naval 
blockade around the island to prevent the Russians from deploying any more nuclear 
weapons. He was the one who conceived the vivid Pearl Harbor metaphor — the 
idea that a US military strike on Cuba would be repugnant because of its moral 
equivalence to Japan’s assault on America’s Pacific outpost in 1941 — that was crucial 
in making credible the argument that a US blockade was preferable to a strike on 
Cuba. He was the one, Thirteen Days further suggested, who devised the brilliant 
strategy at the denouement of the missile crisis of accepting the proposals contained 
in Soviet leader Nikita S. Khrushchev’s 26 October letter to JFK, but rejecting the 
less conciliatory ones articulated in his message the following day — an approach 
that ended the crisis, thereby moving the world away from the precipice of nuclear 
destruction.3
From the extravagant criticisms of Thomas Reeves and Seymour Hersh to the 
measured critiques developed by Herbert Parmet and James Giglio, so much of the 
general historiography on the Kennedy presidency over the past 40 years has involved 
scholars attempting to extricate the debate on JFK from the powerful ‘Camelot’ myths 
propagated by court historians such as Sorensen and Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., and the 
general cult of John Kennedy that emerged in the wake of his tragic assassination. 
True in general terms, this process of myth identification and eradication is equally 
essential in the effort to develop a credible perspective on the Cuban missile crisis; and 
hereafter cited as Presidential Recordings: Kennedy, II; Philip Zelikow and Ernest May (eds.), The 
Presidential Recordings: John F. Kennedy: The Great Crises (New York and London: Norton, 2001), 
vol. III — hereafter cited as Presidential Recordings: Kennedy, III. The transcripts and documents 
cited in this essay, unless otherwise specified, come from May and Zelikow’s Kennedy Tapes. If any of 
the transcriptions from the Kennedy Tapes were subsequently refined in the ‘Presidential Recordings’ 
project, I have used these updated records and indicated in the footnotes where this has been done. 
As former Kennedy Library historian Sheldon Stern has used the tapes to provide his own refinements 
to the ExComm transcripts, I have utilised his work when the textual changes made are significant. 
In terms of the general literature on the missile crisis, it is vast. The most influential early work was 
Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (New York: HarperCollins, 
1971), and probably the most significant later work has been Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy 
Naftali, ‘One Hell of a Gamble’: Khrushchev, Castro, and Kennedy, 1958–1964 (New York and London: 
Norton, 1997).
3 Robert F. Kennedy, Thirteen Days: A Memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis (New York: Norton, 1971, 
paperback ed.), passim; White, Missiles in Cuba, p. 138.
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the core mythology enveloping and distorting our understanding of the missile crisis 
has been that produced by the self-serving assertions of Robert Kennedy’s Thirteen 
Days, created at a time when the New York senator was gearing up to run for the 
presidency and was thus keen to do all he could to develop a statesmanlike image.4
The ExComm tapes expose the hyperbole surrounding Robert Kennedy’s role 
in the missile crisis, evident in both Thirteen Days and in many subsequent histories 
of the event. The ultimately successful US effort to defuse the missile crisis was a 
collaborative one in which Robert Kennedy’s role was significant but in many 
instances less so than his ExComm colleagues. The adroit American response to the 
Soviet challenge in October 1962 was dependent on a number of factors, including 
the consistent advocacy by influential advisers of the more prudent blockade strategy 
in opposition to the ExComm hawks; the creation of the striking (if not precisely 
applicable) Pearl Harbor metaphor that influenced JFK’s attitude towards the notion 
of a military strike on Cuba; an anticipation of the sort of give-and-take negotiations, 
including a willingness to withdraw from Turkey the American Jupiter missiles that 
could be seen as analogous to Russian nuclear weapons in Cuba, needed if the 
establishment of the blockade were to lead to a peaceful settlement; and an effective 
response to Khrushchev’s confusing advancement of two different sets of proposals 
on 26 and 27 October. In all of these respects, there were ExComm officials whose 
contributions were more important than Robert Kennedy’s.
A qualification to that assertion relates to the fraternal closeness of Robert Kennedy 
to the president and the correspondingly greater influence he had on JFK’s thinking 
than that exerted by other ExComm officials. Bobby Kennedy was the president’s 
most intimate adviser, and his purview extended far beyond the usual domain of an 
attorney general. Following the disastrous Bay of Pigs invasion in spring 1961, that 
domain included foreign policy, and — in particular — Cuba. Unquestionably, the 
ethos of intense familial loyalty promoted by patriarch Joseph P. Kennedy ensured 
that JFK and RFK’s relationship was exceedingly close. Indeed, there was no closer 
relationship between president and adviser in 20th-century American history.5
In that sense, Robert Kennedy’s views were more important than other advisers’ 
because his access to and potential influence over the president were greater. Director 
of the Office of Emergency Planning Edward A. McDermott recalled that, when on 
4 Thomas C. Reeves, A Question of Character: A Life of John F. Kennedy (New York: Free Press, 1991); 
Seymour M. Hersh, The Dark Side of Camelot (Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 1997); Herbert S. Parmet, 
JFK: The Presidency of John F. Kennedy (New York: Dial, 1983): James N. Giglio, The Presidency of John 
F. Kennedy (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1991); Theodore C. Sorensen, Kennedy (New 
York: Harper, 1965); Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House 
(London: Mayflower-Dell reprint, 1967).
5 For useful general works on Robert Kennedy, that provide coverage of his relationship with JFK, see 
James W. Hilty, Robert Kennedy: Brother Protector (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 1997), 
and Ronald Steel, In Love with Night: The American Romance with Robert Kennedy (New York: Simon 
& Schuster, 1999).
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occasion JFK would leave an ExComm meeting and walk on to the porch overlooking 
the South Lawn of the White House, Bobby would join him; and when they rejoined 
their colleagues JFK would announce that a particular decision had been made. 
However, the ExComm records raise the issue of whether Bobby Kennedy’s views 
were largely dependent on the ideas expressed by other officials.6
Comparing the roles played by Robert Kennedy and Secretary of Defense Robert 
S. McNamara in the early days of the missile crisis, as revealed by the ExComm tapes, 
sheds light on the attorney general’s role and its limits, as well as the importance 
of McNamara in managing the missile crisis. As with JFK and most other senior 
US officials, McNamara and Bobby Kennedy were informed of the Soviet missile 
deployment in Cuba on Tuesday 16 October 1962. Both participated in the first two 
ExComm meetings, convened that day by JFK to frame his administration’s initial 
response to the Russian challenge. Shocked by the reality of Soviet nuclear weapons 
90 miles off the coast of Florida, most US officials, including the president himself, 
advocated a retaliatory American attack on Cuba.
The supporters of that approach focused on the idea of a US air strike on the 
Caribbean island that would destroy the Soviet missile sites. There was also a ‘super-
hawk’ position of proposing a full-scale invasion of Cuba. Contrary to his reputation 
as always being central to the ExComm discussions, Robert Kennedy was generally 
taciturn in those first two meetings held on 16 October. When he did speak, however, 
he revealed that his initial views in the missile crisis were those of a ‘super-hawk’. A 
good deal of the discussion that day was about whether a strike on the missile sites in 
Cuba, or a more general strike, would be the more appropriate response. The thrust 
of Robert Kennedy’s comments was that his brother should probably plump for the 
more drastic alternative of an invasion of the island. In the first ExComm meeting, 
which convened in the late morning, he added to his brother’s enumeration of four 
options and issues to be mulled over:
We have the fifth one, really, which is the invasion. I would say that you’re dropping 
bombs all over Cuba … dropping it on all their missiles. You’re covering most of 
Cuba. You’re going to kill an awful lot of people, and we’re going to take an awful lot 
of heat on it … you’re going to announce the reason that you’re doing it is because 
they’re sending in these kind of missiles.
Well, I would think it’s almost incumbent upon the Russians, then, to say, “Well, we’re 
going to send them in again. And if you do it [bomb] again, we’re going to do the same 
thing to Turkey. And we’re going to do the same thing to Iran.”
Robert Kennedy was suggesting that because Khrushchev could respond to an 
American air strike on missiles in Cuba by sending in more nuclear weapons, it 
would be better to invade the island and replace the Castro regime with a pro-US 
government that would not accept further Soviet missile deployments. Later in the 
6 Oral history of Edward A. McDermott, p. 44, document no. 3205, ‘The Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962’ 
collection, National Security Archive, Washington, DC.
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same meeting, Robert Kennedy asked Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Maxwell 
D. Taylor to clarify how long it would take to carry out an invasion of Cuba and take 
control of the island.7
In the evening ExComm meeting of 16 October, the attorney general continued 
to focus on the invasion option. When the president reduced the alternatives for 
the US to an air strike on the missile sites in Cuba or a more general strike, Bobby 
Kennedy reminded his brother of the invasion alternative. He proceeded to make the 
case that “if you’re going to get into it [Cuba] at all, whether we should just get into 
it, and get it over with, and take our losses.” He also speculated on pretexts that could 
be used to justify a US invasion, on “whether there is some other way we can get 
involved in this, through Guantanamo Bay or something. Or whether there’s some 
ship that … you know, sink the Maine again or something.” In other words, a similar 
incident to the one that led to the Spanish-American War in 1898 would help make 
another invasion of Cuba seem necessary in 1962.8
There were probably two reasons why Robert Kennedy’s views were so hardline on 
16 October. One was the anger he felt at the way Khrushchev had deceived JFK by 
giving assurances that he would not send offensive missiles to Cuba whilst secretly doing 
precisely the opposite. On learning of the Russian missile deployment in Cuba the 
attorney general expressed that anger in no uncertain terms: “Oh shit! Shit! Shit! Those 
sons of bitches Russians.” For Robert Kennedy, it was a case of Khrushchev damaging 
not only American national security interests but his family as well. Moreover, from the 
inception of JFK’s anti-Castro covert programme Operation Mongoose in November 
1961, in which Robert Kennedy was assigned a leading role, his basic aim was to 
fashion a truculent US policy towards Cuba that would lead to Castro’s overthrow. At 
the start of 1962, in fact, he had told other US officials that ousting the Cuban leader 
was the Kennedy administration’s top objective. Once the missile crisis began those 
hardline sentiments continued to shape Robert Kennedy’s thinking, at least initially.9
McNamara’s assessment of the situation on the opening day of the missile crisis 
was more wide-ranging and impressive than Robert Kennedy’s. He discussed the 
issue of the location and storage of Soviet warheads in Cuba, encouraged JFK to 
sanction more extensive surveillance of the island, and speculated that Republican 
and Democratic politicians, and perhaps the press, would find out about the missiles 
in Cuba within a week.10
7 Transcript, ExComm meeting, 11:50 a.m.–1 p.m., 16 October 1962, Presidential Recordings: Kennedy, 
II, p. 416; transcript, ExComm meeting, 11:50 a.m., 16 October 1962, Kennedy Tapes, p. 74.
8 Transcript, ExComm meeting, 6:30 p.m., 16 October 1962, Kennedy Tapes, pp. 94, 99, 100–1.
9 Quoted in White, Missiles in Cuba, p. 78; memorandum for the record, 22 November 1961, and 
memorandum from Richard Helms to John McCone, 19 January 1962, in Foreign Relations of the 
United States (FRUS), 1961-1963, vol. X, Cuba, January 1961–September 1962 (Washington, DC: 
US Government Printing Office, 1997), http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-
63v10/d275 [accessed on 22 May 2012].
10 ExComm transcript, 11:50 a.m., 16 October 1962, pp. 49–52, 64.
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Crucially, McNamara — and not Robert Kennedy — introduced into ExComm’s 
discussions the idea of blockading Cuba, independent of any US military action 
against the island. In the evening ExComm meeting, he outlined three options: one 
was to mount any of the various types of attack on Cuba that had been discussed 
that day; one was to embark on a political strategy, explored earlier by Secretary of 
State Dean Rusk (whose influence on the Kennedy White House never matched 
his status), such as a diplomatic approach to Castro or Khrushchev; and one was to 
undertake a
course of action we haven’t discussed, but lies in between the military course we 
began discussing a moment ago and the political course of action, is a course of 
action that would involve declaration of open surveillance: A statement that we would 
immediately impose a blockade against offensive weapons entering Cuba in the future 
and an indication that, with our open surveillance reconnaissance which we would 
plan to maintain indefinitely into the future, we would be prepared to immediately 
attack the Soviet Union in the event that Cuba made any offensive move against this 
country.
Later in the meeting he reminded his colleagues of the blockade alternative, though 
he made clear he was not yet endorsing it.11
By introducing the idea of a blockade of Cuba into ExComm’s deliberations, 
McNamara made a vital contribution to the Kennedy administration’s successful 
management of the missile crisis. Prior to that point, the ExComm debate had been, 
for the most part, over different ways of attacking Cuba. McNamara converted the 
discussion from an evaluation of the military alternatives to an assessment of the 
potential effectiveness of those military options in comparison to a naval blockade. 
That was crucial because the prospect of a severe, military Soviet response, one that 
could bring about war, was less likely with a blockade than with a US air strike on 
or invasion of Cuba.
The rest of what McNamara said on 16 October strengthened the argument 
for the blockade and against an attack on Cuba. He maintained that the Russian 
missiles on the island were of political significance — they were “primarily a 
domestic political problem” — but had little bearing on the Soviet-American 
military balance. (He presumably argued this as Khrushchev could already strike 
the United States with missiles based on Russian soil.) In addition, McNamara 
implored his colleagues to think about the ramifications of the proposed US 
responses to the Soviet missile deployment: “I don’t believe we have considered 
the consequences of any of these actions satisfactorily … I don’t know quite 
what kind of a world we live in after we have struck Cuba, and we’ve started 
it.” If Soviet missiles in Cuba had little military significance and if ExComm 
officials were to compare the probable consequences of a US attack on Cuba 
11 Transcript, ExComm meeting, 6:30–8:00 p.m., 16 October 1962, Presidential Recordings: Kennedy, 
II, p. 437; ExComm transcript, 6:30 p.m., 16 October 1962, p. 114.
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with a blockade of the island, then the argument for the blockade would clearly 
be strengthened.12
In the ExComm meeting, which convened two days later in the late morning 
of Thursday 18 October, McNamara again promoted the blockade in a way that 
Robert Kennedy did not. Towards the end of this discussion, the attorney general 
agreed with McNamara that the blockade had emerged, along with a military strike, 
as one of the two main alternatives. However, he did not indicate his unequivocal 
support for the quarantine. Indeed, at one point he indicated his scepticism 
towards this approach, telling his brother that “the argument against the blockade 
is that it’s a very slow death. And it builds up, and it goes over a period of months, 
and during that period of time you’ve got all these people yelling and screaming 
about it, you’ve got the examination of Russian ships, shooting down the Russian 
planes that try to land there. You have to do all those things.” Put another way, 
a major drawback with the blockade was that it would not bring about a speedy 
resolution of the crisis.13
McNamara, by contrast, made clear where his sympathies lay: “I lean to the 
blockade.” He did so because “it reduces the very serious risk of large-scale military 
action from which this country cannot benefit under what I call program two [a 
direct military strike on Cuba].” Robert Kennedy, though, was not wholly convinced 
by McNamara’s argument:
ROBERT KENNEDY: What are the chances … You’ve got to say to him [Khrushchev]: 
“They [the Soviets] can’t continue to build these missiles. All right then, so you’re 
going to have people flying over [Cuba] all the time.” Well, at night it looks a little 
different than it did the next morning [after the Soviets have continued to develop 
their missile sites].
McNAMARA: Oh, he’s not going to stop building. He’s going to continue to build….
ROBERT KENNEDY: Are you going to let him continue to build the missiles?
McNAMARA: This goes back to what you begin to negotiate. He says: “I’m not going 
to stop building. You have them [missiles] in Turkey.” At the time you’ve acted by 
putting the blockade on. That’s done.
ROBERT KENNEDY: All right. Then you let them build the missiles?
McNAMARA: Then you talk.14
While Robert Kennedy was suggesting that a blockade might be ineffective because 
it would not remove the missiles already in Cuba, or prevent the Russians from 
12 ExComm transcript, 6:30 p.m., 16 October 1962, pp. 89, 114; ExComm transcript, 6:30–8:00 p.m., 
16 October 1962, Presidential Recordings: Kennedy, II, p. 448.
13 Transcript, ExComm meeting, 11:00 a.m., 18 October 1962, Kennedy Tapes, pp. 157–8; transcript, 
ExComm meeting, 11:10 a.m.–1.15 p.m., 18 October 1962, Presidential Recordings: Kennedy, p. 534.
14 ExComm transcript, 11:10 a.m.–1.15 p.m., 18 October 1962, Presidential Recordings: Kennedy, II, p. 
568.
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continuing to develop those missile sites, McNamara was arguing that the advantage 
of the blockade was that it would lead to a period of negotiations that could result in 
the removal of the nuclear weapons from Cuba. In this way, McNamara presciently 
identified the path that led to the ending of the missile crisis.
This emphasis on the importance of negotiations squared with the analysis 
provided by McNamara just prior to this exchange with Robert Kennedy when he 
discussed with Dean Rusk and National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy how 
Khrushchev and North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) would respond to 
either a US blockade of or military strike on Cuba. With the strike option, the 
secretary of defense argued, Khrushchev would probably retaliate by destroying 
American missiles in Turkey and Italy, and NATO would fracture over such drastic 
US action against Cuba. With the blockade, NATO unity would be preserved and 
the Kennedy administration would need to agree to the removal of its missiles from 
Turkey and Italy in order to persuade the Soviets to withdraw their nuclear weapons 
from Cuba. Examining the consequences of the US reaction to the missiles in Cuba 
— exploring the theme he had introduced in ExComm two days earlier — showed 
“the potential of the blockade.” A compromise settlement, following the imposition 
of a blockade, would be, McNamara suggested, an acceptable resolution of the missile 
crisis. A villain on Vietnam policy, to be sure, the secretary of defense played a vital 
role in October 1962, one for which he has received insufficient credit.15
McNamara was not the only Kennedy adviser to extol the virtues of the blockade 
at an early stage in the ExComm discussions. Former American Ambassador to the 
Soviet Union Llewellyn E. Thompson expressed his support for it, as did Assistant 
Secretary of State Edwin M. Martin, at a meeting of senior officials (that JFK did 
not attend) on 17 October. And in the ExComm session the following morning 
Thompson declared, “My preference is this blockade plan…. I think it’s very 
highly doubtful that the Russians would resist a blockade against military weapons, 
particularly offensive ones, if that’s the way we pitched it before the world.” When 
JFK asked how to remove the missiles already in Cuba, Thompson replied that the US 
would need to maintain surveillance of the island and in the end might be compelled 
to carry out a strike on the missile sites. But, he implied, the blockade at least had 
the potential to end the crisis peacefully whereas a military strike on Cuba did not.16
McNamara and Thompson, therefore, played key roles in the first week of the 
missile crisis. McNamara originated the idea of a blockade, converting a debate on 
the various military options to a discussion of the pros and cons of military action 
and a blockade. Thereafter he reiterated his support for the blockade. On 17 and 
15 Ibid., p. 567.
16 McCone, memorandum for the file, 17 October 1962, in Foreign Relations of the United States, 
1961–1963, vol. XI, Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath (Washington, DC: US Government Printing 
Office, 1997), http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v11/d23 [accessed on 22 
May 2012]; ExComm transcript, 11:00 a.m., 18 October 1962, p. 137.
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18 October Thompson’s backing for the blockade was steadfast, and — as an 
acknowledged expert on the Soviet Union — his views had credibility. It is clear 
from meetings and a private recording made by JFK later on 18 October that he 
and Robert Kennedy changed their views that day: they no longer supported an air 
strike and invasion respectively and now believed the blockade was the best option. 
They had been influenced by those few ExComm officials who had championed a 
blockade from an early stage, notably McNamara but also Thompson.17
Deputy Director of the CIA Marshall S. Carter and Undersecretary of State 
George W. Ball also helped convince the Kennedys that a military strike would be 
an unpalatable US response and that the blockade was the better approach. They 
did this by bringing into the discussion the Pearl Harbor comparison that served to 
discredit the military-strike alternative on the grounds that it was akin to the nefarious 
Japanese attack in 1941. Again because of Thirteen Days, it is a line of argument that 
has been associated with Robert Kennedy. To be sure, the attorney general did come 
to embrace and articulate in ExComm discussions the Pearl Harbor analogy, and 
the comparison between that 1941 assault and a prospective US attack on Cuba 
was important in turning him against the notion of a military strike. However, it 
was Carter who first used the metaphor in an ExComm debate when, in the second 
meeting on 16 October, he argued that, “This coming in there, on a Pearl Harbor 
[kind of surprise attack], just frightens the hell out of me as to what goes beyond ... 
What happens beyond that. You go in there with a surprise attack. You put out all the 
missiles. This isn’t the end. This is the beginning, I think.” Perhaps influenced by what 
Carter had said, Ball noted in a memorandum shortly afterwards that, “We tried 
Japanese as war criminals because of the sneak attack on Pearl Harbor” and hence 
a surprise strike on Cuba would diminish America’s moral authority in the world.18
Most significantly, Ball made the Pearl Harbor comparison in the ExComm 
meeting on the morning of 18 October in a way that struck Robert Kennedy 
powerfully and so altered his thinking. The undersecretary of state, who would later 
oppose Lyndon Johnson’s decision to go to war in Vietnam, emphasised the disquiet 
that would be felt amongst NATO countries, and perhaps in Latin America, if JFK 
were to authorise a strike on Cuba “without warning, without giving Khrushchev 
some way out.” If the US did attack Cuba without warning, that would be “like Pearl 
Harbor. It’s the kind of conduct that one might expect of the Soviet Union. It is not 
conduct that one expects of the United States.”19
17 Kennedy Tapes, pp. 169–72.
18 ExComm transcript, 6:30–8:00 p.m., 16 October 1962, Presidential Recordings: Kennedy, II, p. 466; 
Ball, ‘Position of George W. Ball,’ 17 October 1962, in Laurence Chang and Peter Kornbluh (eds.), 
The Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962: A National Security Archive Documents Reader (New York: New Press, 
1992), p. 121. For background on Ball, see his The Past Has Another Pattern: Memoirs (New York: 
Norton, 1982), and James A. Bill, George Ball: Behind the Scenes in U.S. Foreign Policy (New Haven, 
CT: Yale University Press, 1998).
19 ExComm transcript, 11:00 a.m., 18 October 1962, p. 143.
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JFK commented that if the US carried out an air strike on the missile sites in 
Cuba following an announcement about the nuclear weapons on the island, “It isn’t 
Pearl Harbor in that sense. We’ve told everybody.” Robert Kennedy, however, was 
more impressed by Ball’s argument: “I think George Ball has a hell of a good point … 
We did this [a strike] against Cuba. We’ve talked for 15 years that the Russians being 
[planning for] the first strike against us, and we’d never do that. Now, in the interest 
of time, we do that to a small country. I think it’s a hell of a burden to carry.”20
Two days earlier, on 16 October, Robert Kennedy had famously passed a note to 
the president, during an ExComm discussion, in which he himself invoked memories 
of 1941. It read: “I now know how Tojo felt when he was planning Pearl Harbor.” 
There were two differences between Robert Kennedy’s use of the Pearl Harbor 
analogy and George Ball’s and Carter’s. Firstly, it was not a comparison that could 
be considered by other ExComm officials, as it was made in a private note and not 
a group discussion. Secondly, it was meant literally at a time when Robert Kennedy 
was proposing an invasion of Cuba and the consensus in ExComm was for military 
action. It was not, as Ball and Carter had used it, a comparison made to castigate 
those who were calling for a hasty and dangerous strike on the island.21
It was only after reflecting on George Ball’s argument in that 18 October ExComm 
meeting that Bobby Kennedy began to reject the idea of a military strike on the 
grounds that its resemblance to Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor would damage America’s 
moral standing in the world. In particular, he must have worried about the impact of a 
Pearl Harbor-type strike on his brother’s reputation, both at the time and historically. 
Thereafter he backed the blockade. In a meeting with JFK, former secretary of defense 
Robert A. Lovett and a few other officials on the evening of the 18th, Robert Kennedy 
made clear that he now supported the blockade. He did the same in an ExComm 
meeting the following day, making the Pearl Harbor comparison to condemn the 
belligerence of the administration hawks. By the 19th, then, Robert Kennedy was 
playing the role that he described in Thirteen Days. Had it not been for McNamara 
and Ball, however, it is questionable whether he would have done so. He backed the 
blockade only after McNamara had introduced and supported (along with Tommy 
Thompson et al.) the idea in ExComm, and after hearing Ball’s Pearl Harbor argument 
that he found so powerful and persuasive. Though Robert Kennedy’s contribution was 
important and generally commendable, it was not as impressive as he himself later 
claimed.22
In terms of understanding how negotiations following the establishment of a 
blockade could end the crisis, McNamara — as argued earlier — grasped that point 
20 ExComm transcript, 11:10 a.m.–1:15 p.m., 18 October 1962, Presidential Recordings: Kennedy, II, 
pp. 545, 547.
21 Robert Kennedy, Thirteen Days, p. 9.
22 Kennedy Tapes, p. 170; Leonard C. Meeker, minutes of 11:00 a.m., ExComm meeting, 19 October 
1962, document no. 699, ‘The Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962’ collection, National Security Archive.
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before Bobby Kennedy. JFK’s United Nations Ambassador Adlai E. Stevenson, like 
McNamara, emphasised during the early days of the missile crisis the importance 
of diplomacy. In a private meeting with the president on 16 October, he warned 
against the implementation of an air strike “until we have explored the possibilities 
of a peaceful solution.” The following day he furnished JFK with a memorandum in 
which he again advised against military action, warning that it could lead to nuclear 
war. He understood the pressure on the president to sanction a strike on Cuba, 
but argued that “the means adopted have such incalculable consequences that I feel 
you should have made it clear that the existence of nuclear missile bases anywhere 
is negotiable before we start anything.” This was a clear reference to US Jupiter 
missiles in Turkey, which — Stevenson pointed out — many nations would view 
as comparable to Soviet missiles in Cuba. On the second day of the missile crisis, 
then, Stevenson urged Kennedy to consider the diplomatic possibilities for ending 
the crisis.23
Stevenson’s thinking evolved during the following days. The position he came 
to adopt was that JFK should implement a blockade but then move rapidly to 
a diplomatic settlement in which the US should make concessions to induce 
Khrushchev to withdraw Soviet missiles from Cuba. This was precisely the argument 
he made in the ExComm meeting on the afternoon of 20 October, asserting that the 
US should “offer the Russians a settlement involving the withdrawal of our missiles 
from Turkey and our evacuation of Guantanamo base.” Later in the meeting he also 
mentioned US missiles in Italy as something Kennedy should be willing to forfeit. 
Stevenson’s point on ceding Guantanamo was unrealistic from a domestic political 
point of view, as it would have left the president open to charges of appeasement. 
JFK, unsurprisingly, was quick to refute Stevenson’s argument on surrendering the 
Guantanamo base. But he acknowledged that he would be prepared to discuss the 
removal of US missiles from Turkey, albeit at a later point in the crisis. Along with 
McNamara, Stevenson had impressed upon the Kennedys and other ExComm 
officials the importance of diplomacy and a willingness to compromise in order to 
bring about the withdrawal of nuclear weapons from Cuba and an end to the crisis.24
John Kennedy’s response to Stevenson’s recommendations on 20 October 
demonstrated the change in his views since the opening day of the missile crisis when 
he had favoured an air strike as the best response to the Soviet challenge, a view he 
still held the following morning, 17 October, when he spoke with CIA Director 
John A. McCone. From that point onwards, JFK’s views became less hardline. As 
the missile crisis unfolded, he resolved to implement a blockade rather than an air 
23 Elie Abel, The Missile Crisis (Philadelphia, PA: Lippincott, 1966), p. 49; Stevenson to JFK, 17 October 
1962, Papers of Theodore C. Sorensen, box 49, Kennedy Library.
24 Minutes of the 505th meeting of the National Security Council, 2:30–5:10 p.m., 20 October 1962, in 
FRUS, 1961–1963, XI, http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v11/d34 [accessed 
on 22 May 2012].
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strike that might trigger a superpower war; became more receptive to the idea of 
negotiations in which US concessions would have to be made; and became more 
wary of the bellicosity of his military advisers. By the climax of the crisis on 27 
October there was no US official more determined to end the confrontation over 
Cuba by diplomacy rather than force.25
This development is linked to a broader theme of the Kennedy presidency, namely 
his increasingly progressive outlook, in both domestic and foreign affairs. The John 
Kennedy of 1961 sanctioned the Bay of Pigs invasion and Operation Mongoose to 
oust Fidel Castro, authorised an enormous peacetime increase in military spending 
at a time when the US enjoyed roughly a 17-to-1 advantage over the Soviet Union 
in nuclear weapons, and was wary about promoting civil rights. The John Kennedy 
of 1963 delivered the American University speech calling for a more tolerant attitude 
towards the Soviet Union, signed the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and introduced the 
landmark civil rights bill to end racial segregation. He may also have begun to 
develop doubts about America’s role in Vietnam. The two addresses he gave on 10–
11 June, the first his American University speech, the second his televised address to 
the nation in which he defined civil rights as a moral issue for America, represented 
the rhetorical encapsulation of this more progressive Kennedy presidency. JFK had 
changed as a leader because of his experiences. In particular, the draconian police 
repression of the Birmingham protests in spring 1963 gave Kennedy a more vivid 
understanding of the severity of racial oppression in the South, and in foreign affairs 
it was his responsibility for pulling the United States and the world back from the 
nuclear precipice in the Cuban missile crisis that impressed upon him the dangers 
of the Cold War and the concomitant need for him to craft a more conciliatory 
approach towards the Soviet Union. Hence, the maturation in JFK’s thinking during 
the missile crisis was the start of a longer process in which he reshaped his views on 
politics and international affairs.26
A shift away from his initial belligerence in the missile crisis was evident on 
the third day, 18 October. Kennedy can be criticised for his preference at the start 
of the crisis for a US air strike because if he had felt compelled to make a snap 
decision, the evidence suggests he would have ordered military action against Cuba 
— the consequences of which, given the likelihood that Khrushchev would have 
25 ExComm transcript, 11:50 a.m., 16 October 1962, pp. 66, 71–2; McCone memorandum, ‘Brief 
Discussion with the President,’ 17 October 1962, in Mary S. McAuliffe (ed.), CIA Documents on the 
Cuban Missile Crisis 1962 (Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 1992), p. 165.
26 JFK, commencement address at American University, 10 June 1963, www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/
index.php?pid=9266#axzz1wRpLCNie, and radio and television report to the American people on 
civil rights, 11 June 1963, www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=9271&st=&st1=#axzz1wR
pLCNe [both accessed on 31 May 2012]. For the argument that Kennedy changed and matured 
as his presidency unfolded, see Giglio, Presidency of John F. Kennedy, p. 287, and Mark J. White, 
‘Introduction: A New Synthesis for the New Frontier,’ in White (ed.), Kennedy: The New Frontier 
Revisited (New York: New York University Press, 1998), pp. 12–13.     
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felt obliged to respond in kind in Berlin or Turkey or elsewhere, could have been 
catastrophic. On the other hand, JFK’s switch from an air strike-advocate to a backer 
of the blockade merits praise. It showed his open-mindedness, the flexibility of his 
thinking; and this enabled him to make the sound decision of rejecting the risky 
military option that he and the majority of his advisers originally espoused, in favour 
of a blockade alternative that put pressure on Khrushchev whilst furnishing a window 
of opportunity for the superpowers to negotiate a peaceful settlement. JFK’s ability to 
reflect and change his mind in the Cuban missile crisis stands in stark contrast to the 
sort of dogmatism exhibited by George W. Bush when considering whether to go to 
war against Iraq in 2003.27
JFK also impressed by exploring at an early stage how diplomacy could end the 
missile crisis; and by displaying the resilience needed to stand up to his relentlessly 
hawkish military advisers. Although speechwriter Theodore C. Sorensen recalled that 
Stevenson’s 17 October memorandum calling for give-and-take negotiations had 
vexed the president, the following day in ExComm JFK showed an understanding 
of how diplomacy and mutual concessions might play a role in defusing the crisis. 
When discussing the air strike option, for instance, he speculated on whether it 
would be worth warning Khrushchev that a US attack on Cuba was imminent but to 
use a carrot as well as a stick by saying if he withdrew his missiles from the island, the 
US would take its Jupiter missiles out of Turkey. Later in the same meeting, he told 
his colleagues that in a diplomatic effort to end the crisis, “The only offer we would 
make, it seems to me, that would have any sense … giving him some out, would be 
our Turkey missiles.”28
There were other indications in this ExComm meeting that JFK was moving 
away from the hawkish position he had adopted at the start of the crisis. At one 
point he mapped out a course of action approximating that which he announced 
to the American people on 22 October in his radio and television address: “We do 
the message to Khrushchev and tell him that if work continues, et cetera, et cetera. 
We at the same time launch the blockade. If the work continues, that we go in and 
take them [the Soviet missiles] out.” “We don’t declare war,” he added, in explaining 
how the blockade would be initiated. It was clear from this ExComm discussion that 
Kennedy now viewed the military alternatives as representing but one of two options, 
the other being a blockade; and later that day it was the blockade that he came to 
prefer. As he mulled over the situation on the 18th, the issues that were of particular 
concern to him were maintaining NATO solidarity, decreasing the likelihood of 
drastic Soviet reprisals against Berlin and preventing a superpower nuclear exchange. 
Though for a time Kennedy thought Khrushchev would grab Berlin regardless of 
27 Transcript of JFK dictation, 18 October 1962, Kennedy Tapes, pp. 171–2.
28 Walter Johnson (ed.), The Papers of Adlai E. Stevenson (Boston: Little, Brown, 1979), VIII, p. 299n; 
Sorensen, Kennedy, pp. 695–6; ExComm transcript, 11.10 a.m.–1.15 p.m., 18 October 1962, 
Presidential Recordings: Kennedy, II, pp. 538, 547.
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how the US responded to the missiles in Cuba, in the end all of these concerns played 
a role in converting JFK from an air-strike advocate to a supporter of the blockade.29
The following morning, Friday 19 October, Kennedy’s preference for the blockade 
led to a brutal encounter with the Joint Chiefs who were strongly in favour of military 
action against Cuba. When Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Maxwell Taylor informed 
him of their support for an air strike to be carried out on Cuba without warning, 
JFK explained that his reservations to that approach related to his fear of escalation, 
particularly in Berlin. “If we attack Cuba, the missiles, or Cuba, in any way,” he told 
Taylor and other military officials, “then it gives them [the Russians] a clear line to take 
Berlin, as they were able to do in Hungary under the Anglo war in Egypt ... we would 
be regarded as the trigger-happy Americans who lost Berlin. We would have no support 
among our allies.” The irascible General Curtis E. LeMay disagreed, arguing that a 
blockade constituted something close to appeasement. Admiral George W. Anderson 
likewise asserted that the blockade would be ineffective. Kennedy, in robust fashion, 
countered that if he sanctioned an attack on Cuba, Khrushchev would be compelled to 
retaliate, and the most likely target would be Berlin. He kept trying to make the Joint 
Chiefs view the Cuban situation, as he had to as president, in a broader context: “You 
know, as I say, the problem is not really some war against Cuba. But the problem is part 
of this worldwide struggle where we face the Communists, particularly … over Berlin.” 
And by stating that, “The argument for the blockade was that what we want to do is 
to avoid, if we can, nuclear war by escalation or imbalance,” Kennedy tried to induce a 
degree of restraint on the part of his military advisers.30
The dangerous belligerence Kennedy was faced with from his own military was 
apparent from what the Joint Chiefs said, with the tape still recording, once Kennedy 
had left the room. In a scene that would not have looked out of place in Stanley 
Kubrick’s 1964 cinematic masterpiece Dr. Strangelove, an angry General David 
Shoup said:
If somebody could keep them [JFK and his civilian advisers] from doing the goddamn 
thing piecemeal. That’s our problem. You go in there and friggin’ around with the 
missiles. You’re screwed. You go in and frig around with anything else, you’re screwed. 
You’re screwed, screwed, screwed. And if some goddamn thing, some way, he could 
say: “Either do this son of a bitch and do it right, and quit friggin’ around.” That was 
my conclusion. Don’t frig around and go take a missile out.
For all the implausibilities of Oliver Stone’s 1991 film JFK, one theme it developed 
that was credible was the tension between Kennedy and his own military. In 
retrospect, the gung-ho pressure applied by the Joint Chiefs in their discussions with 
29 ExComm transcript, 11:00 a.m., 18 October 1962, pp. 144–6; ExComm transcript, 11:10 a.m.–
1.15 p.m., 18 October 1962, Presidential Recordings: Kennedy, II, pp. 581, 589, 593.
30 Transcript, meeting between JFK and the Joint Chiefs, 9:45 a.m., 19 October 1962, Kennedy Tapes, 
pp. 174–175, 178–179, 183, 186; transcript, meeting between JFK and the Joint Chiefs, 9:45–10:30 
a.m., 19 October 1962, Presidential Recordings: Kennedy, II, pp. 581, 589, 593.
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Kennedy was a bar to a peaceful, diplomatic ending to the missile crisis. Kennedy’s 
ability to withstand that considerable pressure reflected well on his leadership, and 
was a key part of the campaign he waged within his administration, from 18 October 
onwards, in favour of the blockade.31
That campaign culminated on the afternoon of Saturday 20 October, in 
Kennedy’s announcement to his ExComm colleagues that “he was ready to go ahead 
with the blockade.” While ordering his military advisers to further their plans for 
an attack on Cuba, in case he subsequently felt obliged to order one, he made clear 
he was receptive to the idea of negotiations leading to US withdrawal of its Jupiter 
missiles from Turkey and Italy as part of a final settlement. He did not want to offer 
their removal — only to be ready to do so if the Russians raised the issue. Along with 
Stevenson and McNamara, Kennedy explored the notion of trading the Jupiters more 
thoroughly than any ExComm official during the first week of the missile crisis.32
Following Kennedy’s public announcement of the blockade in his speech on 22 
October, and then the initiation of the blockade on the morning of Wednesday 24 
October, the focus of JFK and his advisers was on the successful implementation 
of the quarantine: they hoped that Soviet ships heading towards the blockade zone 
would stop or turn around, which they did on the 24th, and that a Soviet ship 
or one under Soviet charter would permit itself to be boarded, which the Marucla 
consented to on the morning of the 26th. Early in the second week of the missile 
crisis, therefore, Kennedy concentrated on the mechanics of establishing the blockade 
and, like his advisers, said little on the vital question of what step he should take 
next if the Russians respected the blockade but did not remove their missiles from 
Cuba. When he did consider that issue he indicated a preference for the extension 
of the blockade so as to prohibit petroleum, oil and lubricants (POL) as well as 
weapons from reaching the island. That would ultimately bring the Cuban economy 
to a standstill and so increase the pressure on Khrushchev and Castro. He remained 
preoccupied with Berlin, considering how to respond should the Soviets insist on 
inspecting US convoys there, deciding to put the hero of the 1948–9 Berlin crisis, 
General Lucius D. Clay, on standby to be sent to the city, and concluding that any 
US invasion of Cuba would provoke Soviet seizure of West Berlin.33
By Thursday 25 October, JFK still viewed the extension of the blockade so as to 
include POL as his likely next step, as he informed British Prime Minister Harold 
Macmillan in a telephone conversation. But a surprisingly hawkish Robert Kennedy 
31 Transcript, meeting between JFK and the Joint Chiefs, 9:45–10:30 a.m., 19 October 1962, 
Presidential Recordings: Kennedy, II, pp. 597–8.
32 Minutes of the 505th meeting of the National Security Council, 2:30–5:10 p.m., 20 October 1962.
33 Don Munton and David A. Welch, The Cuban Missile Crisis: A Concise History (New York and 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), p. 70; transcript, ExComm meeting, 10:00 a.m., 23 October 
1962, pp. 293, 309, transcript, ExComm meeting, 6:00 p.m., 23 October 1962, p. 341, transcript, 
JFK-Macmillan telephone conversation, 7:00 p.m., 24 October 1962, p. 385, transcript, ExComm 
meeting, 10:00 a.m., 25 October 1962, pp. 412, 417 — all in Kennedy Tapes.
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challenged his brother’s thinking in ExComm that day by claiming an air strike on 
the missiles in Cuba might be better than a clash with the Soviets at sea. McNamara, 
to his credit, disagreed, arguing that vigorous US surveillance over Cuba would 
be sufficient to display American resolve for a few more days. Factoring in Robert 
Kennedy’s analysis, JFK concluded towards the end of this ExComm session that the 
two options to consider, should Soviet work on the missile sites continue, were the 
air strike and the extension of the blockade to cover POL. The following morning, 
however, he spoke in favour of the POL initiative as his next course of action, not the 
air-strike idea his brother had entertained.34
At that morning’s ExComm meeting on Friday 26 October, there was a definite 
sense, with the US having just boarded the Marucla, that the first phase of the 
second week of the crisis was over, namely that the blockade had been successfully 
enforced, and that the second phase had begun, one in which the Kennedy 
administration would need to decide on an additional course of action should the 
Soviets maintain in Cuba the missiles already deployed. Some hardline sentiments 
were expressed. Secretary of the Treasury C. Douglas Dillon argued that a US air 
strike on the missile sites would be better than an intensification of the blockade. 
But JFK was a force for moderation. When some of his advisers said they were wary 
about considering a settlement that would leave Castro in power for the foreseeable 
future, he said that his administration’s priority had to be the removal from Cuba of 
nuclear weapons, and not Castro. In other words, the administration’s longstanding 
objective of ousting Castro should not be allowed to prevent the fashioning of a 
reasonable settlement to the crisis. Furthermore, when Adlai Stevenson predicted 
(accurately for the most part) that in any settlement Khrushchev would demand a 
US no-invasion pledge regarding Cuba, as well as the dismantling of US missiles 
in Turkey and Italy, JFK defended him from McCone’s criticism by suggesting that 
Stevenson, in emphasising the use of negotiations, had identified one of only two 
methods that could actually bring about a withdrawal of the missiles from Cuba, 
the other being military action; the blockade, or an intensification of the blockade 
to cover POL, would not by itself prove efficacious. “We’ve only got two ways 
of removing the weapons,” he told his CIA director. “One is to negotiate them 
out … the other is to go in and take them out.” So Stevenson’s analysis was not 
unreasonable.35
The following day, Saturday 27 October, was of decisive importance in 
determining the outcome of the Cuban missile crisis. By this point Khrushchev had 
impaled Kennedy and his advisers on the horns of a dilemma: how to respond to 
34 Transcript, JFK-Macmillan telephone conversation, 6:00 p.m., 25 October 1962, p. 428; transcript, 
ExComm meeting, 5:00 p.m., 25 October 1962, pp. 432–3, 437; transcript, ExComm meeting, 
10:00 a.m., 26 October 1962, p. 448 — all in Kennedy Tapes.
35 ExComm transcript, 10:00 a.m., 26 October 1962, pp. 448–9, 460–4; transcript, ExComm meeting, 
10:10–11.20 a.m., 26 October 1962, Presidential Recordings: Kennedy, III, p. 312.
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the two different sets of proposals he had advanced in his private message to JFK on 
the 26th calling for a US pledge not to invade Cuba in return for removal of Soviet 
missiles from the island, and his public message to the president on the morning of 
the 27th in which the additional concession of the withdrawal of the Jupiters from 
Turkey was demanded.36
Famously, after mulling over the issue with his advisers, John Kennedy responded 
by sending a letter to Khrushchev embracing his proposals of 26 October, not the 
27th. He also dispatched Bobby Kennedy to Anatoly F. Dobrynin to tell the Soviet 
ambassador in Washington that the US would withdraw its Jupiters from Turkey 
but that this would have to be a clandestine part of the settlement. This approach 
worked, for on the following day Khrushchev agreed to back down and order the 
removal of Russian missiles from Cuba.37
Robert Kennedy claimed for himself the lion’s share of the credit for devising the 
wise strategy that ended the most dangerous crisis of the nuclear age, and specifically 
for hatching the plan to ignore Khrushchev’s more hardline message of the 27th 
and to embrace his more conciliatory letter of 26 October. The transcripts for the 
ExComm meetings held on 27 October expose that claim as a self-serving chimera. 
Before Robert Kennedy came to back the approach of ignoring Khrushchev’s second 
proposition and agreeing to his first set of proposals, several ExComm officials voiced 
their support for that strategy, notably Pentagon official Paul H. Nitze, McGeorge 
Bundy, Sorensen and Stevenson. As with the advocacy of the blockade and the use of 
the Pearl Harbor metaphor in the first week of the missile crisis, the administration’s 
response to Khrushchev’s proposals on 26–27 October was a collaborative effort — 
and Robert Kennedy’s role was less significant than he later claimed.38
John Kennedy, however, was immensely impressive in ExComm on 27 October. 
From an early stage in the discussions that day, he made the case that “most people 
would regard this [27 October Khrushchev offer] as not an unreasonable proposal.” 
Hence the Kennedy administration would find it “very difficult to explain why we are 
going to take hostile military action in Cuba, against these sites … when he’s saying, 
‘If you’ll get yours out of Turkey, we’ll get ours out of Cuba’. I think you’ve got a very 
tough one here.” Later on he reiterated that the apparent fairness of Khrushchev’s 
36 Khrushchev to JFK, 7:00 p.m., 26 October 1962, http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/
frus1961-63v11/d84 [accessed on 22 May 2012], and Khrushchev to JFK, 27 October 1962, http://
history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v111/d91 [accessed on 22 May 2012] — both in 
FRUS, 1961–1963, vol. XI.
37 Michael Dobbs, One Minute to Midnight: Kennedy, Khrushchev, and Castro on the Brink of Nuclear War 
(London: Hutchinson, 2008), pp. 306–9, 332–5. For Dobrynin’s record of his meeting with Robert 
Kennedy, see his cable to the Soviet Foreign Ministry, 27 October 1962, Cold War International 
History Project Bulletin 5 (Spring 1995), www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nsa/cuba_mis_cri/moment.htm 
[accessed on 25 May 2012].
38 Robert Kennedy, Thirteen Days, pp. 79–80; transcript, ExComm meeting, 10:00 a.m., 27 October 
1962, Kennedy Tapes, pp. 497–9, 501–2.
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proposed settlement meant that world opinion would be firmly set against a US 
attack on Cuba, and anyway such an assault would be perilous as it would trigger 
Soviet retaliation in Berlin.39
JFK depended on advisers such as McGeorge Bundy and Ted Sorensen 
who grasped that he could write back to the Soviet leader accepting his proposal 
of the 26th rather than the 27th; and he did initially express reservations about 
Khrushchev’s 26 October offer on the grounds that its provision of a US pledge not 
to invade Cuba represented a guarantee that Castro would stay in power. However, 
Kennedy’s wariness over the use of American force to end the crisis was commendable, 
particularly as Maxwell Taylor and other military officials were pushing him towards 
an air strike on Cuba two days hence, to be followed by an invasion. The decision 
JFK ultimately made — to accept in writing Khrushchev’s 26 October proposal of 
a US no-invasion pledge in return for removal of the missiles from Cuba, while 
dispatching his brother to tell Dobrynin of their willingness to withdraw the Jupiters 
from Turkey as long as it remained a clandestine component of the settlement — was 
manifestly effective in ending the missile crisis. Moreover, Kennedy’s consideration 
of what has become known as the Cordier ploy, first revealed by Dean Rusk in 1987, 
suggests that JFK in the final analysis might well have plumped for a publicly-made 
concession on the Jupiters to end the crisis if Khrushchev had rejected the notion of 
a secret Jupiter deal.40
In addition to the light it sheds on the roles played by leading US officials, 
the ExComm tapes bring into focus some general themes of importance. One 
is the interrelatedness of the Cuban crisis and the Berlin situation. It is easy to 
think of those issues as linked but essentially separate. But in fact the threads of 
the crisis in Berlin were tied to the strands of the crisis in Cuba to form, from 
Kennedy’s perspective, a single tapestry. Kennedy and his advisers consistently 
viewed the Cuban missile crisis in a Berlin context. Khrushchev’s missile gambit in 
the Caribbean, ExComm officials concluded, was due in large measure to a desire 
to strengthen his position in Berlin. The respective merits of a blockade of Cuba 
and a military strike on the island were to be gauged to a great extent by the sort 
of Russian reprisals each would provoke in Berlin. By the climax of the crisis on 
27 October, JFK was still factoring Berlin into his analysis of the situation. If one 
believes that Khrushchev’s demands on Berlin at the Vienna summit in June 1961 
were influenced by an impression of Kennedy weakness created by the failure of 
39 Transcript, ExComm meeting, 10:05–11.55 a.m., 27 October 1962, Presidential Recordings: Kennedy, 
III, pp. 364, 381; Sheldon M. Stern, Averting ‘The Final Failure’: John F. Kennedy and the Secret Cuban 
Missile Crisis Meetings (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003), p. 295.
40 ExComm meeting, 10:00 a.m., 27 October 1962, p. 499; transcript, ExComm meeting, 4:00 
p.m., 27 October 1962, p. 563; Mark J. White, ‘Dean Rusk’s Revelation: New British Evidence 
on the Cordier Ploy,’ Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations Newsletter 25 (September 
1994): 1–9; Patrick Dean to Foreign Office, 25 October 1962, Foreign Office Records 371/162387, 
National Archives, Kew, Richmond.
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the Bay of Pigs invasion, that Kennedy’s determination to prevail in the summer 
1961 Berlin crisis was linked to his humiliation at the Bay of Pigs, and that a desire 
to give himself another card to play in relation to Berlin was one of the factors 
prompting Khrushchev in 1962 to deploy missiles in Cuba, then it is clear that 
historians need to think in terms of one ongoing Cuba-Berlin crisis in 1961–2, 
rather than separate Berlin and Cuban crises. 
The ExComm tapes also add to our understanding of the Kennedy 
administration’s policies before the missile crisis as well as during the crisis itself. 
Those policies were designed to do everything possible, short of a direct attack on 
Cuba by American forces, to oust Castro. They included the Bay of Pigs invasion, 
covert pressure in the form of Operation Mongoose, economic sanctions, and 
diplomatic isolation by engineering Cuba’s expulsion from the Organization of 
American States. Even the assassination of Castro was planned and attempted, 
though the extent to which JFK and his civilian advisers had been briefed about 
and endorsed these plots has been disputed. In a brilliant 1990 article in Diplomatic 
History, James Hershberg even presented sufficient evidence to pose the question of 
whether in the autumn of 1962, prior to the missile crisis, Kennedy was seriously 
considering an attack on Cuba.41
The declassified ExComm tapes reinforce the point that US military preparations 
were underway, even before JFK was informed about the missiles in Cuba, so that 
Kennedy could sanction an attack on the island at short notice. On the opening 
day of the missile crisis McNamara reminded the president that, “We have been 
moving already, on a very quiet basis, munitions and POL.” On the third day of 
the crisis there was an exchange among senior Kennedy advisers, albeit with JFK 
having left the meeting, that decoded refers, in the judgment of this historian, to the 
assassination of the Cuban leader:
TAYLOR: I thought we were hoping last night that we would get the collapse of 
Castro…
BUNDY: I believe that Castro is not going to sit still for a blockade and that that’s 
to our advantage. I’m convinced myself that Castro has to go. I always thought … It 
never occurred to [me before], I just think, his [Castro’s] demon is self-destruction and 
we have to help him to that.
McNAMARA: Well, then you’re going to pay a bigger price.
BUNDY: Later.
McNAMARA: Later. And I think that’s a possibility.
Arguing that the US should help Castro with his own “self-destruction” seems to be 
a reference to an effort to assassinate Castro. This supplements other evidence that 
41 James G. Hershberg, ‘Before “The Missiles of October”: Did Kennedy Plan a Military Strike against 
Cuba?’ Diplomatic History 14 (Spring 1990): 163–98.
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senior US officials, including the president, did know about and backed CIA plans 
to kill Castro.42
All of this highlights the importance of a continued assessment of the Kennedy 
administration’s policies towards Cuba before the missile crisis. Around two decades 
ago scholars had added to the ongoing lively debate on the events of October 1962 
by examining the origins of the missile crisis. Historians such as Thomas Paterson 
and Michael Beschloss made the argument that JFK’s policies — such as the Bay 
of Pigs invasion, Operation Mongoose, assassination plots, threatening military 
manoeuvres in the Caribbean, economic sanctions and diplomatic pressure — 
influenced Khrushchev’s decision in spring 1962 to deploy missiles in Cuba; and 
that in this way, JFK bore significant responsibility for the onset of the missile crisis, 
which is not the same thing as saying Khrushchev’s missile gambit was justified. A 
number of works written in the last decade or so have focused, as scholarship did in 
the 1960s and 1970s, on those 13 days in October 1962 when the world teetered 
on the nuclear brink. In his 2008 study of the missile crisis One Minute to Midnight, 
for example, Michael Dobbs started his narrative on 16 October 1962. And Sheldon 
Stern, in Averting ‘The Final Failure’: John F. Kennedy and the Secret Cuban Missile 
Crisis Meetings (2003), devotes very little of his account to the pre-missile crisis 
period. To skim over the question of causation would be, in a historiographical sense, 
a regressive step. In future, monographs on the missile crisis should proceed along 
the twin tracks of the origins of the crisis and the crisis itself, as they tended to in 
the late 1980s and 1990s. If this occurs, a consensus might crystallise around the 
idea that, when it came to Cuba, Kennedy’s record was something of a curate’s egg 
— unimpressive before October 1962, but commendable during the crisis itself.43
With JFK’s handling of the missile crisis, the bottom line is that he succeeded 
in bringing about the withdrawal of nuclear weapons from Cuba and so ending the 
crisis without triggering a superpower war and without having to proffer concessions 
that were excessively generous. What the full ExComm tapes reveal are the precise 
contributions made by JFK and his advisers. In so doing, they make clear that Robert 
Kennedy was not the hero of the missile crisis. He did not hatch the plan for the 
blockade, originate the powerful Pearl Harbor metaphor in ExComm discussions, 
or devise the plan at the climax of the crisis that dealt effectively with Khrushchev’s 
two different sets of proposals. He did come to embrace all of these approaches 
42 ExComm transcript, 11:50 a.m., 16 October 1962, p. 69 (the emphasis is my own); ExComm 
transcript, 11.10 a.m.–1.15 p.m., 18 October 1962, Presidential Recordings: Kennedy, II, p. 568; 
Stern, Averting ‘The Final Failure’, p. 115; U.S. Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental 
Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, interim report, S.Rept. 94–465, 94th Congress, 1st 
session, Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders, passim.
43 Thomas G. Paterson, ‘The Defense-of-Cuba Theme and the Missile Crisis’, Diplomatic History 14 
(Spring 1990): 249–56; Michael R. Beschloss, The Crisis Years: Kennedy and Khrushchev, 1960–1963 
(New York: Edward Burlingame, 1991 paperback ed.), p. 381; Dobbs, One Minute to Midnight; 
Stern, Averting ‘The Final Failure’.
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and ideas, and had an influence on his brother, but it is not clear that he would 
have taken any of these positions had it not been for the arguments made by other 
officials that he found cogent. At the same time JFK, though initially supportive 
of the air-strike option, grasped at an early stage the necessity for negotiations and 
mutual concessions, and showed no little fortitude in resisting the trigger-happy 
proclivities of his military advisers. A number of other officials, notably McNamara, 
Ball, Stevenson and Thompson, merit considerable praise. They played a key and 
frequently underestimated role in October 1962. Paradoxically, it was McNamara, 
forever maligned by association with the Vietnam War, whose contribution to the 
management of the Cuban missile crisis was the greatest of any of John Kennedy’s 
advisers. Works written on the missile crisis in the past decade, such as those by 
Michael Dobbs, Sheldon Stern, and Don Munton and David Welch, have failed to 
highlight McNamara’s crucial role. In evaluating the roles played by the Kennedy 
team, therefore, historians need to shift to a new perspective, one that gives Robert 
McNamara, and not Robert Kennedy, the greatest credit for guiding John Kennedy 
along the path to peace in October 1962.44
44 Dobbs, One Minute to Midnight; Stern, Averting ‘The Final Failure’; Munton and Welch, Cuban 
Missile Crisis.
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